The European right and aid to Ukraine. What remains of its campaign promises?
In May 2024, Geert Wilders reminded the Dutch parliament that his signature was on a pledge to keep giving Ukraine military and financial support. Just six months earlier, his Party for Freedom had won the most seats in a general election after calling for an end to Dutch arms deliveries to Kyiv. Czech politician Andrej Babiš followed a similar course. Before the election, he promised to shut down the Czech initiative to buy ammunition for Ukraine. As prime minister, he found himself explaining the terms on which it would continue.[1][2][3][4]
What does a promise to cut aid to Ukraine mean to a voter? Weapons can still reach Ukraine after a government stops paying for them out of its own budget. In the Netherlands, Czechia and Italy, voters can already compare what politicians said with what their governments did. In France, the question is still one for a presidential candidate. Which forms of aid does Marine Le Pen actually promise to end if she wins?
The Netherlands. What did Wilders sign?

Wilders took a clear position during the November 2023 election campaign. The Netherlands should stop sending weapons to Ukraine, he argued, because it needed them for its own defence. His Party for Freedom finished first. To form a government, it needed partners who favoured continued aid. In February 2024, while those talks were still under way, Wilders publicly signalled that he was willing to consider further arms deliveries. In May he signed a coalition agreement committing the Netherlands to continued political, military, financial and moral support for Ukraine.[1][5][2]
By autumn, voters could see what that concession meant in practice. On 6 October, the defence minister in Dick Schoof’s government announced that the Netherlands would make around €400 million available for a drone programme for Ukraine. On 18 October, the ministry announced a €42.6 million purchase under the programme. Anyone who had voted to end arms deliveries could now compare Wilders’s campaign position with his signature on the agreement and a contract to supply the drones.[6][7]
Czechia. Babiš kept the programme he had promised to scrap

Ahead of the 2025 parliamentary election, ANO leader Andrej Babiš criticised the Czech programme for supplying artillery ammunition to Ukraine. Prague located ammunition on the international market and arranged purchases with funding from other countries. Babiš said the programme was too expensive and lacked transparency. He promised to close it and suggested that the European Union or NATO take on the job.[3]
On 6 January 2026, now prime minister, Babiš announced that Czechia would continue to coordinate the purchases as long as other countries paid for them. For Czech taxpayers, the distinction mattered. The new government would no longer contribute its own funds. For Ukraine, what mattered was that the supply route Babiš had pledged to close would remain open, with Prague still in charge.[4][8]
The decision also carried a political cost for Tomio Okamura, leader of Freedom and Direct Democracy and Babiš’s coalition partner. In January, Okamura himself reminded reporters that his party had campaigned against continued Czech participation. He described the requirement for foreign funding as a coalition compromise. After discussing the matter with the prime minister, Okamura announced that his party’s MPs would back the government in a confidence vote. Voters for either party could ask the same question. How did a promise to leave the programme become an agreement to stay in it as long as someone else paid?[9][10]
Italy. Voters knew both of Salvini’s positions before the election
In May 2022, League leader Matteo Salvini publicly called on Italy to stop sending weapons to Ukraine. That December, as deputy prime minister, he took part in the cabinet meeting at which Giorgia Meloni’s government unanimously approved the continuation of arms deliveries.[11][12]
One date matters in judging Salvini’s record. On 11 August, before the September election, the League and its allies published a joint platform explicitly pledging support for Ukraine. Meloni herself had said as early as July that Italy would keep supplying weapons to Kyiv if the right won. Salvini’s remarks in May were at odds with the decision he backed in government. Voters could, however, read the prospective coalition’s position before casting their ballots. On this issue, Meloni did what she had promised.[13][14]
France. Which forms of aid does Marine Le Pen promise to end?
In November 2022, Marine Le Pen told France Inter that sending arms to Ukraine helped prolong the war. In a 2024 interview with BFMTV, she made a case for arms deliveries. France should supply weapons, she said, if they could put Ukraine in a stronger position at the negotiating table. Negotiations remained her stated goal. What changed was the role she saw for French weapons in getting there.[15][16]
In autumn 2026 the debate turned to money. On 14 October, Le Pen said that if she won the presidency, she would maintain financial aid for a further six months and then end it. After meeting Ukraine’s ambassador on 16 November, she confirmed that France would honour its existing commitments, including its part in the EU’s €90 billion loan to Ukraine. That figure covers the entire EU loan. Le Pen also pledged to continue donating equipment and providing humanitarian aid. The crucial word in her October promise was financial. A voter expecting all French support to end is reading more into the pledge than Le Pen said. How she would carry it out as president can only be tested if she wins.[17][18][19]
Why some in Russia look to the European right for peace
In Russian debates over the war in Ukraine, the European right has acquired a reputation in some quarters as a voice of reason. For some commentators, a politician prepared to challenge Brussels and talk to Moscow holds out the prospect of negotiations. There is a basis for that expectation. In January 2025, the Russian news outlet RBC noted that some on the European right had both criticised military aid to Kyiv and called for dialogue with Russia to resume. In March, the newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta described how Eurosceptics had come to be seen in Russia as politicians willing to take Moscow’s views into account. What prompted the editorial was Le Pen’s reaction to Washington’s abrupt suspension of military aid to Ukraine. In her view, Ukrainian troops should have had time to prepare.[20][21]
The Czech election shows how such expectations can take shape before a new government has made a single decision. In October 2025, Russian senator Alexey Pushkov saw the victory of Babiš’s party as a chance for Viktor Orbán to gain an ally in the EU. What might such an alliance deliver for those hoping for fewer weapons shipments and an early start to negotiations? The first part of that expectation can be checked. In January, Babiš confirmed that Prague would keep sourcing ammunition for the Ukrainian army if other countries paid for it.[22][4]
This is how the image of a “party of peace” can obscure what happens in office. For observers in Russia who already see a victory for a critic of Brussels as a step towards peace, an argument over the bill can draw attention away from the deliveries themselves. Babiš took ammunition purchases off the Czech budget while keeping Kyiv’s supply route open. Wilders went further and agreed that his own country would continue paying for military aid. In both cases, the Ukrainian army retained support that some of these politicians’ backers might have expected to end.[2][4]
Where is the line between compromise and misleading voters?
A Babiš voter has a straightforward point to make. The candidate promised to close the programme. The prime minister kept it. A Wilders voter can ask an equally pointed question. What was the point of voting to end arms deliveries if the party leader was willing to keep them going during the very talks that brought his party into government? In both cases, the public record shows which pledge gave way and what voters got in practice. Whether either politician intended from the outset to go back on his word remains an open question.[3][4][2]
Pressure from Brussels alone is too simple an explanation. In the Netherlands, Dutch parties negotiated the agreement to continue aid. In Prague, the Czech government decided to keep the ammunition programme open with foreign funding. The politicians who made those choices can answer for them. The best time to put the question to them is before an election. If you campaign on ending military aid to Ukraine, are you prepared to stay in opposition if the price of joining a coalition is giving up that pledge?
References
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 NOS, comparison of the foreign policy platforms of the Party for Freedom and its potential coalition partners, 23 November 2023 (in Dutch).
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 Dutch House of Representatives, transcript of Geert Wilders’s remarks in the debate on the coalition agreement, May 2024 (in Dutch).
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 Reuters, on Andrej Babiš’s election pledge and the Czech president’s response, 6 October 2025.
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 Government of the Czech Republic, Babiš’s statement on the conditions for continuing the ammunition initiative, 6 January 2026.
- ↑ Reuters, on Wilders’s willingness to consider further military aid during coalition talks, 24 February 2024.
- ↑ Dutch Ministry of Defence, announcement of the drone programme for Ukraine, 6 October 2024 (in Dutch).
- ↑ Dutch Ministry of Defence, purchase of drones from DeltaQuad, 18 October 2024 (in Dutch).
- ↑ Reuters, on Czechia’s decision to continue coordinating purchases without contributing national funds, 6 January 2026.
- ↑ ČT24, Okamura’s explanation after a coalition meeting, January 2026 (in Czech).
- ↑ E15, Okamura’s announcement that his MPs would back the government in the confidence vote, January 2026 (in Czech).
- ↑ Corriere della Sera, on Salvini’s speech in the Senate opposing further arms deliveries, 19 May 2022 (in Italian).
- ↑ Rai News, on the unanimous cabinet decision to extend arms deliveries and Salvini’s participation in the meeting, December 2022 (in Italian).
- ↑ Pagella Politica, text of the Italian centre-right coalition’s election platform, 11 August 2022 (in Italian).
- ↑ Reuters, via Euronews, on Meloni’s pledge to keep sending weapons to Ukraine if the right won, 23 July 2022.
- ↑ France Inter, interview with Le Pen on arms deliveries, 15 November 2022, Strasbourg public media libraries catalogue (in French).
- ↑ BFMTV, video interview with Le Pen on the circumstances in which France should supply weapons to Ukraine, 2024 (in French).
- ↑ Le Figaro, on Le Pen’s six-month timetable for financial aid, 14 October 2026 (in French).
- ↑ Reuters, via Boursorama, on Le Pen’s meeting with Ukraine’s ambassador, 16 November 2026 (in French).
- ↑ Council of the European Union, approval of the EU loan to Ukraine for 2026 and 2027, 23 April 2026.
- ↑ RBC, on the rise of the European right and its possible consequences in 2025, 2 January 2025 (in Russian).
- ↑ Nezavisimaya Gazeta, editorial on perceptions of the European right as pro-Russian, 5 March 2025 (in Russian).
- ↑ Argumenty Nedeli, on Senator Pushkov’s assessment of a possible alliance between Babiš and Orbán, 5 October 2025 (in Russian).