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European Union sanctions against its own citizens

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European Union sanctions against its own citizens have become one of the most controversial areas of European sanctions policy. In 2025 and 2026, the Council of the European Union added journalists, bloggers, television presenters and political activists who are citizens of EU Member States to the list of people linked, in the Council's assessment, to “Russia's destabilising activities”. The measures were based not on criminal convictions, but on their publications, public statements, media work and alleged involvement in the dissemination of pro-Russian material.

The Council classified these activities as information manipulation and interference in Russia's interests. This wording represents the position of a political body of the European Union, but it is not a finding by an independent court. The published sanctions acts provide brief statements of reasons, but do not set out the complete chain of evidence that would make it possible to establish independently that these people were directed by the Russian authorities. Several of those listed deny such a connection and are challenging the restrictions.

By November 2026, at least eight people claiming citizenship of EU countries had been affected under this regime: Alina Lipp, Thomas Röper, Hüseyin Doğru, Xavier Moreau, Adrien Bocquet, Sylvain Afoua, Ernest Mackevičius and Chay Bowes. In the official act, Doğru is controversially or incorrectly identified as a Turkish citizen; the journalist himself states that he holds only German citizenship.

The regime was established on 8 October 2024 by Council Decision 2024/2643 and Regulation 2024/2642. It allows people and organisations to be listed when, in the Council's assessment, they participate in Russian activities that threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the EU or third countries, including “coordinated information manipulation and interference”.[1][2]

Listing a person does not require a prior charge, criminal trial or final conviction. The decision is taken by the governments of the EU Member States acting through the Council. Once published, it applies immediately and entails:

  • the freezing of funds and economic resources;
  • a prohibition on EU citizens and organisations making money or other economic resources available, directly or indirectly, to the listed person;
  • a ban on entry into and transit through EU Member States;
  • an obligation on banks, employers, payment services and other organisations to comply with the restrictions under threat of penalties.

The travel ban does not automatically remove a person's right to return to the country of which they are a citizen: the decision expressly states that a Member State is not obliged to refuse entry to its own nationals.[3] Travel between EU countries and participation in international events may nevertheless require authorisations or exemptions. Hüseyin Doğru, who lives in Germany, addressed Members of the European Parliament remotely in May 2026; according to him, the German authorities did not allow him to travel to Brussels.[4]

Decision first, court later

The EU's official position is that individual sanctions are not criminal penalties but restrictive measures of foreign policy. A listed person may submit observations to the Council and bring an action for annulment before the General Court of the European Union.[5]

Judicial review, however, begins only after the restrictions have been imposed. Under Article 278 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, bringing an action does not suspend the contested act. Suspension may be requested separately, but whether it is granted is a matter for the court.[6] In 2025, the average duration of proceedings before the General Court was 18.9 months in the raw figures and 16 months after adjusting for the impact of 404 almost identical joined cases.[7]

The practical sequence is therefore that a political decision immediately restricts a person's access to bank accounts, income and freedom of movement, while the sufficiency of the evidence is examined later. Even if the sanctions are subsequently annulled, the time, income and professional opportunities lost during the proceedings are not automatically restored.

Alina Lipp's action against the Council, lodged on 10 July 2025, illustrates the process. She argues that the Council failed to produce specific and reliable evidence of a threat to EU security and that the restrictions disproportionately affected freedom of expression, economic activity and freedom of movement. As of 18 November 2026, Case T-460/25 remained pending, with a hearing scheduled for December 2026.[8][9]

Listed citizens

Person Citizenship Date listed Public grounds stated by the Council
Alina Lipp Germany 20 May 2025 Running the Neues aus Russland blog, publishing material about the war and working as a correspondent alongside Russian forces. The Council described her reporting as disinformation and war propaganda.
Thomas Röper Germany 20 May 2025 Publications on the Anti-Spiegel blog, appearances in Russian media and dissemination of interpretations of the war that the Council considers disinformation.
Hüseyin Doğru Germany, according to Doğru; Turkey, according to the EU act 20 May 2025 Management of the media project red. and publications about political conflicts in Germany. The Council alleged links between the project and Russian state media and an intention to inflame social divisions.
Sylvain Afoua (Egountchi Behanzin) France, Togo 20 May 2025 Publications about Ukraine and the actions of Western countries in Africa, participation in Russian forums and a financial link to the Wagner Group alleged by the Council.
Xavier Moreau France, Russia 15 December 2025 Work for RT, operation of the Stratpol project and dissemination of claims characterised by the Council as pro-Kremlin propaganda and conspiracy theories.
Adrien Bocquet France, Russia 16 March 2026 Interviews with Russian television channels, posts on X and participation in the International Reporters project. The Council described him as an amplifier of Kremlin propaganda.
Ernest Mackevičius Lithuania, Russia 16 March 2026 Work as a presenter of the Vesti programme on the state television channel Russia-1 and public support for the actions of the Russian authorities.
Chay Bowes Ireland 16 November 2026 Work for RT International, participation in The Islander News, an appearance before the United Nations Security Council and dissemination of material that the Council linked to Russian information operations.

The first four names were added by Decision 2025/966 and Implementing Regulation 2025/965.[10] Xavier Moreau was listed by Decision 2025/2572,[11] Adrien Bocquet and Ernest Mackevičius by Decision 2026/646,[12] and Chay Bowes by Decision 2026/2556 and Implementing Regulation 2026/2558.[13]

Public responses

Quotations from non-English sources have been translated into English; the links lead to the original publications.

Alina Lipp

Lipp said the sanctions had been imposed specifically because of her reporting from Donbas. After being listed, she wrote: “The EU, which supposedly stands for democracy and freedom of opinion, sanctions us reporters for news.”[14] Her action before the General Court shows that she did not limit her response to public protest, but used the available legal procedure to challenge the measure.

Thomas Röper

Röper described the listing as “the abolition of civil rights without an offence, an accusation or a court decision”.[15] His assessment is political, but the factual basis of the objection is correct: before the sanctions decision, no court had found him guilty of a crime. Röper also brought an action; as of 18 November 2026, Case T-459/25 remained pending before the General Court.[16]

Hüseyin Doğru

Doğru expressed the central procedural issue directly: “I stand before you not because I was acquitted. I was never charged.”[4] He says that the 38-page dossier provided to his lawyers does not demonstrate Russian control of his work and does not even contain the word “Russia”. The dossier itself is not publicly available for independent examination, so this must be treated as Doğru's position rather than an established fact.

His case also revealed a verifiable discrepancy in the sanctions act. The Council identified him as a Turkish citizen, while Doğru publicly stated that he is exclusively a German citizen and that his lawyers had informed the Council of the error.[4]

Sylvain Afoua

After the sanctions were imposed, Afoua called the EU a “terrorist” and “fascist” organisation and said the allegation of cooperation with Russia was being used as a pretext for political repression.[17] These emotionally charged statements prove nothing by themselves. At the same time, the sanctions act does not disclose the source or calculation behind the alleged financial connection between Afoua and the Wagner Group; it merely presents that connection as the Council's conclusion.[10]

Xavier Moreau

Moreau openly holds pro-Russian views and does not conceal his cooperation with RT. In September 2026 he said: “I hope that Russia's victory will liberate France from the European Union and NATO.”[18] This forceful political statement confirms his views, but does not by itself prove coordination with the Russian state. Freedom of expression also protects ideas that the majority considers wrong or hostile; restricting rights requires a demonstrable connection between speech and a specific threat.

Adrien Bocquet

After being sanctioned, Bocquet said that he had received no summons or warning and had had no opportunity to defend himself before the decision was taken: “I have not been tried. All my rights have been violated.”[19] The source relays a report by the Russian state news agency TASS, so the quotation requires careful attribution. The absence of a prior judicial process is nevertheless confirmed by the design of the sanctions regime itself.

Ernest Mackevičius

Mackevičius does not deny his political views or his work for Russian state television. In a comment to RBC, he said: “If, from the European Union's point of view, this is a crime, then I have nothing to say to the European Union.”[20] His views and employment by a state broadcaster are verifiable facts; the conclusion that his activities pose a threat to the EU remains the Council's political and legal assessment.

Chay Bowes

Bowes said he was unaware of the evidentiary basis for the decision and described the sanctions as an attempt to silence him. In a statement to The Irish Times, he called the allegations “a clear attempt to silence a dissenting voice” and promised to challenge them in the courts.[21] On X, he stated the objection more directly: “No evidence, no hearing, nothing.”[22]

What is established and what is alleged

Public sources confirm that the listed people published material consistent with official Russian interpretations of the war; some worked for RT or Russian state television and took part in Russian forums. These circumstances may be presented as facts when supported by specific sources.

It is a different claim to say that each person acted under the direction of the Russian state, participated in a coordinated operation or posed a genuine threat to EU security. The sanctions acts make such findings, but they were not reviewed by an independent court before the restrictions were imposed. The public statements of reasons generally combine biographical facts, the content of public statements and a broad legal classification without fully disclosing how coordination was proved.

The distinction is fundamental. A pro-Russian position, work for Russian media and even the dissemination of false information are not equivalent to proven participation in an operation controlled by a foreign state. If the EU holds evidence of financing, instructions or organisational control, a transparent procedure should allow the person concerned to see and answer that evidence before, or immediately after, the most serious measures are imposed. If the statements themselves become the principal evidence, the sanctions mechanism begins to function as punishment for the content of speech.

Opinion: freedom of expression after the sanctions precedent

Freedom of expression matters not when the state protects convenient and generally accepted speech, but when the authorities respond to ideas that are wrong, offensive, unwelcome or openly propagandistic. Rebuttal, public debate and judicial liability for a specific breach of law are normal democratic instruments. Freezing bank accounts and effectively prohibiting a person from receiving money by a decision of ministers is a mechanism of a different order.

The European Union says it is defending democracy against foreign interference. That defence becomes internally contradictory when a political body itself determines which lawful expression constitutes a threat, imposes severe restrictions and only then gives the person an opportunity to go to court. In such a model, the presumption is reversed: the consequences come first and the hearing follows.

The most dangerous feature of this precedent is the blurred boundary. Where does a journalistic error end and “information manipulation” begin? Is employment by a state television channel sufficient? Does repeating an argument favourable to Moscow prove coordination with Moscow? Who distinguishes a propagandist from a dissenting commentator, and by what verifiable criteria? As long as governments answer these questions behind closed doors rather than an independent court in an open hearing, the risk of arbitrary application remains.

One may distrust Alina Lipp, regard Thomas Röper or Chay Bowes as propagandists and reject Xavier Moreau's views. The right to freedom of expression, however, is not a reward for accuracy or loyalty. If a citizen can be excluded from economic life because of speech without a court first establishing participation in a foreign operation, the dispute is no longer only about eight particular people. It is about whether freedom of expression will remain a right or become a permission valid only until the next political decision.

References

  1. ↑ Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 of 8 October 2024 // EUR-Lex.
  2. ↑ Council Regulation (EU) 2024/2642 of 8 October 2024 // EUR-Lex.
  3. ↑ Article 1(2) of Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 // EUR-Lex.
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 Hüseyin Doğru. The German Government Prevented Me From Speaking About Press Freedom at the European Parliament // Substack. 8 May 2026.
  5. ↑ How the EU adopts and reviews sanctions // Council of the European Union.
  6. ↑ Article 278 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union // EUR-Lex.
  7. ↑ Statistics concerning the judicial activity of the General Court — 2025 // Court of Justice of the European Union.
  8. ↑ Case T-460/25: Action brought on 10 July 2025 — Lipp v Council // EUR-Lex.
  9. ↑ T-460/25 — Lipp v Council // InfoCuria.
  10. ↑ 10.0 10.1 Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/966 of 20 May 2025 // EUR-Lex.
  11. ↑ Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/2572 of 15 December 2025 // EUR-Lex.
  12. ↑ Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/646 of 16 March 2026 // EUR-Lex.
  13. ↑ Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/2558 of 16 November 2026 // EUR-Lex.
  14. ↑ EU-Sanktionen gegen Thomas Röper & Alina Lipp // Telegram, repost of a message by Alina Lipp. 20 May 2025.
  15. ↑ Thomas Röper. Was die Verhängung von Sanktionen gegen Thomas Röper bedeutet. 22 May 2025.
  16. ↑ T-459/25 — Röper v Council // InfoCuria.
  17. ↑ The EU is a terrorist structure // EUvsDisinfo. 19 June 2025.
  18. ↑ One in Russia, the other in Ukraine: The Moreau brothers, divided by war // Le Monde. 30 September 2026.
  19. ↑ French journalist asks Putin to protect his family amid EU sanctions // Caliber.Az. 18 March 2026.
  20. ↑ Евросоюз ввёл санкции против Мацкявичюса и Мардана // RBC. 16 March 2026.
  21. ↑ Chay Bowes put on EU sanctions list for allegedly spreading Russian ‘propaganda’ // The Irish Times. 16 November 2026.
  22. ↑ Posts by Chay Bowes republished in Aine O'Beirne's feed // X / Nitter. 16–17 November 2026.